This paper derives an intertemporal optimality condition for economies with private information, focusing on a class of recursive preferences. By comparing it to the situation where agents can freely save in a risk-free asset market, we derive the optimal savings distortions necessary for constrained optimality. Our recursive preferences are homogeneous and satisfy a balanced-growth condition, while allowing us to separate the role of risk aversion and intertemporal elasticity of substitution. We perform some quantitative exercises that disentangle the respective roles played by these two parameters in optimal distortions and the implied welfare gains. r
Introduction
When perfect insurance is unavailable, savings may help individuals smooth the impact on consumption of temporary shocks to income. However, models that derive imperfect insurance from private information suggest banning free access to savings. Constrained efficient allocations in these economies require some distortion in individuals' savings decisions (Diamond and Mirrlees, 1977; Rogerson, 1985; Ligon, 1998; Golosov et al., 2003; Farhi and Werning, 2006) . The goal of this paper is to further our understanding of the differences between constrained-efficient allocations and market equilibria. In particular, we investigate the role of preferences.
It is useful to frame the comparison of the market equilibrium and the planning problem in terms of the different variations on consumption plans that are feasible in each case.
With unfettered access to a risk-free asset, agents can perform the following variation to their consumption plans. At any point in time, individuals can lower their current consumption by one unit and increase it in all future periods and contingencies by a constant absolute amount, equal to the net rate of return. At a market equilibrium, individuals find themselves at an optimum within this class of variations. The corresponding optimality condition is the familiar intertemporal Euler equation.
As in Farhi and Werning (2006) , we find that gains are decreasing in the concavity of the production function. In partial equilibrium with a linear production function, gains can be extremely large. By contrast, for an endowment economy welfare gains are zero under our hypothesis of a geometric random walk consumption process. For the intermediate case of a neoclassical production function, welfare gains are greatly mitigated.
The steady state of the optimal allocation with savings distortions feature a lower capital stock and a higher interest rate than the corresponding steady state of the market equilibrium, where the precautionary savings motive is at work. The variance of consumption growth and the coefficient of relative risk aversion control the strength of this motive and hence both the interest rate increase and the decrease in capital between the baseline steady state and the optimal steady state. The intertemporal elasticity of substitution on the other hand controls the speed of the transition: the higher r À1 , the faster the transition, and the higher the welfare gains. The configuration of these three parameters influences greatly the magnitude of the welfare gains.
Constrained efficiency vs. free savings
In this section we present a two period economy to introduce the basic concepts and set the stage for the rest of the paper. Against this background, in the next section we turn to an infinite horizon economy with recursive preferences.
Consider a simple economy with two periods t ¼ 0; 1. There is no uncertainty at t ¼ 0 but at the beginning of period t ¼ 1 a state s 1 2 S is realized; we assume S is finite, with #S values and pðsÞ is the probability of outcome s 1 ¼ s. The agent consumes in the first period and consumes and works in the second. Let c 0 denote consumption in the first period and ðc 1 ðsÞ; Y 1 ðsÞÞ denote consumption and output as a function of the realized state in the second period.
We adopt a general specification of preferences and denote the agent's utility functional over allocations by Uðc 0 ; c 1 ðÁÞ; Y 1 ðÁÞÞ. Thus, U takes a scalar c 0 and two functions c 1 ðÁÞ and Y 1 ðÁÞ as inputs. As a special benchmark case, one can assume the state s 1 determines the worker's productivity and that the worker has an expectedutility function uðc 0 ; c 1 ; e 1 Þ over consumption in both periods and work effort e 1 ðsÞ Y 1 ðsÞ=s. Then 
for some q40. Here, R ¼ 1=q is the rate of return between periods 0 and 1.
Free savings

First-best
The first-best allocation simply maximizes utility subject only to technology equation (1). At this allocation the first-order conditions for consumption are given by 
In the expected-utility case this equation specializes to the familiar Euler equation 
Then the first-order conditions for the agent's utility maximization problem with respect to savings k 1 delivers Eq. (2). 1 Note that the budget constraints (4a)-(4b) imply the resource constraint (1).
A general set-up
More generally, under what conditions does (2) hold? Consider the abstract optimization problem of maximizing utility Uðc 0 ; c 1 ðÁÞ; Y 1 ðÁÞÞ subject to ðc 0 ; c 1 ðÁÞ; Y 1 ðÁÞÞ 2 F for some constraint set F. This nests as special cases both the first-best planning problem-with F ¼ F fb defined by the resource constraint (1)-and the agent's optimization in the free-market setting-with F ¼ F fm defined by the budget constraints (4a)-(4b). Suppose that starting from any allocation ðc 0 ; c 1 ðÁÞ; Y 1 ðÁÞÞ 2 F it is possible to define simple variations that maintain the allocation in F:
for all D in neighborhood of D ¼ 0. That is, a feasible allocation can be perturbed by decreasing (increasing) consumption in the first period, while increasing (decreasing) consumption in parallel across all states s in the second period. Note that the same output allocation Y 1 ðsÞ, Y 1 ðsÞ=s, is maintained for all states s. Property (5) holds for both the first-best planning problem and the agent's optimization problem in a freemarket setting. More generally, whenever it is satisfied at an optimum, then the generalized Euler equation (2) must be satisfied.
Second-best with private information
Consider next a private-information setting, where the state s is observed only by the agent. By the revelation principle, the best the planner can do is to request a report r 2 S from the agent regarding s 2 S and assign consumption and output in the second period accordingly. Without loss of generality, one can assume that telling the truth is optimal.
Let r ¼ sðsÞ denote a reporting strategy for the agent, mapping true states of the world s 2 S into reports r 2 S. Let S denote the set of all strategies. The truth-telling strategy is denoted by s Ã ðsÞ ¼ s for all s 2 S. An agent using strategy s 2 S obtains ðc 
The second-best planning problem corresponds to the case where F ¼ F sb defined by equations (1) and (6). A second-best optimum maximizes utility subject to selecting an allocation in F sb . In this general context, typically property (5) with F sb fails. The next proposition, however, provides an example where it holds. Proposition 1. Let Uðc 0 ; c 1 ðÁÞ; Y 1 ðÁÞÞ ¼Ûðc 0 ; c 1 ðÁÞ À vðY 1 ðÁÞ; ÁÞÞ whereÛ monotone in its second argument. Then property (5) holds for F sb for all feasible allocations ðc 0 ; c 1 ðÁÞ; Y 1 ðÁÞÞ 2 F sb .
Proof. The result follows by noting that incentive compatibility (6) holds if and only if cðsÞ À vðY ðsÞ; sÞXcðrÞ À vðY ðrÞ; sÞ 8r; s 2 S, which is independent of c 0 and invariant to the operation of exchanging cðÁÞ for cðÁÞ þ D for any D. & If property (5) holds for all D (not just in a neighborhood around D ¼ 0) then it is without loss of generality to allow agents to freely save, in the sense that the planner can allow the agent to select the value for D in this variation. It follows that, for the class of preferences identified by the proposition, the planner can allow the agent to save freely, without distortions, at the technological rate of return R ¼ 1=q. The economic interpretation of the quasi-linear specification c À vðY ; sÞ is that there are no income effects on work effort. Savings from the first period do not then affect the choice between work effort and earnings. As a result, they do not disturb incentive compatibility and property (5) holds.
An equivalent way of postulating property (5) 
Distorted savings
From the previous subsection, we know that the variations that result from free savings do not generally preserve incentive compatibility. In this situation, what can we say about the desirability of free savings? We approach this question in two complementary ways.
A Lagrangian approach
The first is to attach Lagrange multiplier mðsÞ on the incentive constraints (6), leading to an optimality condition that includes the effect that D may have on incentive constraints: 
Feasible variations
Another line of attack is to find a different variation, that does preserve incentive compatibility, without changing work effort. This leads to an intertemporal optimality condition that does not involve Lagrange multipliers. One can then compare this optimality condition with the Euler equation (2).
The idea is to find a variation function dðD; sÞ on consumption in the second period that depends on the realized state s so that For example, with expected utility and uðc 0 ; c 1 ; e 1 Þ ¼ûðc 0 ; c 1 Þ À hðe 1 Þ a variation that is feasible is to set dðD; sÞ so that uðc 0 þ D; c 1 ðsÞ þ dðD; sÞÞ ¼ûðc 0 ; c 1 ðsÞÞ þ AðDÞ 8s 2 S,
where AðDÞ is such that X s2S ðD þ dðD; sÞÞpðsÞ ¼ 0.
This variation shifts utility in a parallel way across states s 2 S. It preserves incentive compatibility because these parallel shifts cancel each other out on both sides of Eq. 
Logarithmic balanced-growth preferences
Within this class of preferences, an interesting special case with several advantages is the logarithmic balanced-growth specification uðc 0 ; c 1 Þ ¼ logðc 0 Þ þ b logðc 1 Þ. In this case the variations induce parallel multiplicative shifts over second-period consumption: dðD; sÞ ¼dðDÞc 1 ðsÞ
for somedðDÞ. Intuitively, incentives are provided by proportional rewards and punishments. If consumption is scaled up or down by a constant it does not change the incentives for work effort. In this case, unlike the preference class described in Proposition 1, income effects for work effort are nonzero. Proportional variations are feasible precisely because of the balanced-growth condition, which implies that income and substitution effects exactly cancel each other.
This logarithmic case seems economically appealing, because of the primitives and the simple proportional variations it permits. One simple generalization of this case is to the expected-utility case where
and whereũðcÞ ¼ c 1Àa =ð1 À aÞ. This class of preferences also satisfies a balanced-growth condition. It is easily verified that once again the feasible variations are proportional in consumption, as in (13).
In the next section we extend this class to an infinite horizon economy. Preferences that lead to the feasibility of proportional variations turn out to be very tractable. In particular, they lead to a very simple optimality condition. Within a class of baseline allocations, the optimum is easily identified and its welfare improvements quantified.
Recursive preferences
We now turn to an infinite horizon and introduce a class of recursive preferences that are homogeneous in the consumption process and separate risk aversion from the intertemporal elasticity of substitution as in Epstein and Zin (1989) . Consumption and work effort are not assumed to be separable, but satisfy a balancedgrowth condition.
For this class of preferences, we provide simple variations on consumption that maintain incentive compatibility. The variations involve proportional shifts in consumption that do not affect incentives. Both the homogeneity and the balanced-growth specification on preferences are crucial for this result.
Based on these variations we derive the intertemporal optimality condition at the end of the section. The condition is shown to be incompatible with allowing agents to freely save. In this way, an intertemporal wedge on savings is present at the optimal allocation. Thus, some form of distortion on savings is required in any tax implementation of the optimum. In the next section we explore the welfare gains from adhering to this condition for some simple cases.
Our preferences do not satisfy the separability condition required for Atkinson-Stiglitz's uniform taxation theorem. Despite this, it is optimal in the absence of uncertainty to set the intertemporal distortions to zero. Thus, for these preferences, optimal distortions in savings arise from ongoing idiosyncratic uncertainty, just as in the additively separable expected-utility case that leads to the Inverse Euler condition.
Moral hazard
We build on the following simple static moral-hazard model. At the beginning of the period, the agent first exerts effort a, which is not observable by the planner. The state of nature s is then realized from the distribution PðsjaÞ. The planner observes s and gives the agent consumption cðsÞ. The agent's expected utility is given by
E½UðcðsÞhðaÞÞja.
We suppose the agent's utility UðcÞ is a power function. This specification satisfies the standard balancedgrowth assumption, for which income and substitution effects cancel out. An equivalent reformulation of the agent's objective is UðChðaÞÞ,
represents the certainty-equivalent obtained from the random consumption cðsÞ. For our dynamic setting, we proceed analogously. At the start of period t the worker chooses effort a tÀ1 , then the state s t is realized and observed and the planner allocates consumption cðs t Þ. Effort affects the distribution of state s t and lowers utility by a factor hða t Þp1 with hð0Þ ¼ 1. Preferences are given by the recursion
where
represents lifetime-certainty-equivalent consumption, with
is the certainty-equivalent function and
is a time aggregator, mapping current consumption and future utility into a constant-consumption equivalent.
With this representation of preferences, one can easily see the analogy with the simple static setting. By a change of variables, however, the same preferences can be represented in the following, more convenient, way. 
That is,â dominates a and yields the same utility as without the variation, which in turn is dominated by the recommended action a Ã which also yields the same utility as after the variation. This establishes that a Ã remains incentive compatible. &
Private information: a dynamic Mirrleesian economy
Here we build on Mirrlees' static private information model. At the beginning of the period, the agent privately observes productivity y. The agent then makes a report r and the planner gives the agent consumption cðrÞ as function of the report. The agent's expected utility is E½UðcðrÞhðr; yÞÞjs, where r ¼ sðyÞ is the agent's reporting strategy. We suppose the agent's utility UðcÞ is a power function. This specification satisfies the standard balanced-growth assumption, for which income and substitution effects cancel out.
For our dynamic setting, we assume the following structure of uncertainty. At the beginning of the period a state s t is realized and publicly observed by the agent and planner. Then y t is realized and observed only by the agent. To simplify we assume that s t and y t take on a finite number of values. After observing the shock y t the agent makes a report r t regarding it to the planner. We collect the variables observed by the planner by z 
The proof of the next result is in the Appendix. 
Then for any D 0 there exists a D such that ðc; h;ṽÞ satisfy (22) and (23) if: (a) Conditional on s t , the realization of y t is independent and identically distributed; or (b) r ¼ 1 so that uðxÞ ¼ log x.
We do not impose restrictions on the stochastic process for the observable state s t . Regarding the unobservable shock, the requirement in part (a) does not restrict the process for productivity, and can, in particular, accommodate any degree of persistence. What this requirement does ensure is that the states that affect the evolution of shocks are observable, that there are no hidden states. Although this implies that the observable state s t is a sufficient statistic for ðs t ; y t Þ, in the sense that Prðs tþn ; y tþn js t ; y t Þ ¼ Prðs tþn ; y tþn js t Þ, optimal allocations typically depend on the history y t . In this way, the history of reports r t is relevant. False past reports may then affect the allocation the agent receives, but do not affect the planner's capacity to predict the agent's future productivity. This tractability allows us to find variations that maintain incentive compatibility.
In the logarithmic case, r ¼ 1, the crucial property is that
Hence, setting D 1Àb ðD 0 Þ b ¼ 1 in the variations does not affect the utility delivered by any reporting strategy. As a result, no assumption on the structure of uncertainty is required.
The intertemporal optimality condition: the Golden Ratio or the modified Inverse Euler equation
Let us say that an allocation is efficient if it minimizes the present value of consumption E P 1 t¼0 q t c t and delivers a given lifetime utility level in an incentive compatible way. Then any efficient allocation cannot be improved by the variations above. That is, these variations cannot reduce the discounted value of consumption.
Fix 
The first-order necessary and sufficient condition for optimality is simply
Thus, optimality requires the ratio of current to lifetime utility ð1 À bÞuðc t Þ=uðv t Þ to be equated to the ratio of current consumption with its expected present value c t = P 1 s¼0 q s E t ½c tþs . Rearranging, the ratio of current consumption and utility must be equated to the ratio of the present value of consumption with lifetime utility:
Both conditions formalize the optimality of a form of consumption smoothing. We call them the Golden Ratio conditions. The next result re-expresses the optimality condition above in a way that is more suitable for comparison with the optimality condition-the Euler equation-that results when agents can save freely at the interest rate q À1 . We call this condition the Modified Inverse Euler equation.
Proposition 4. Define
(a) At the optimum in (24) the following condition holds:
(b) If agents can borrow and save freely at the interest rate q À1 , then the allocation must satisfy the following Euler equation:
Savings will generally be distorted at the optimal allocation, since the Modified Inverse Euler equation and the Euler equation are incompatible. Thus, in any implementation of the planner's optimum, agents cannot be allowed to borrow and save freely at the interest rate 1=q.
Suppose that the optimality condition (28) holds. Define the intertemporal wedge t by solving for the factor ð1 À tÞ required so that the Euler equation (29) holds when 1=q is replaced with ð1 À tÞ=q:
so that
Importantly, the intertemporal wedge t is zero whenever there is no uncertainty. For the case of certainty, Atkinson-Stiglitz's uniform-taxation result requires preferences to be separable between consumption and leisure. However, in our recursive specification preferences are not separable. Interestingly, despite this, the absence of resolution of uncertainty between two periods implies that there should be no intertemporal distortion on savings there. In other words, although the separability conditions required by Atkinson-Stiglitz are violated, their uniform commodity taxation result holds under certainty with our preferences. Thus, optimal distortions can be entirely attributed to ongoing idiosyncratic uncertainty, just as in the additively separable expected-utility case that leads to the Inverse Euler equation (Golosov et al., 2003) . Note that if g ¼ 1 one gets that t40, guaranteeing that the intertemporal distortion on savings is positive. Another interesting case is when c t is a geometric random walk at the baseline allocation, so that c tþ1 ¼ tþ1 c t . It then follows that v t is proportional to c t , and t40. We shall study this case in more detail in the next section.
Constant absolute risk aversion preferences
In this subsection, we show that for a particular class of preferences with constant absolute risk aversion the optimal distortion on savings is zero. In a static moral-hazard setting, a convenient specification of preferences is
where UðxÞ ¼ Àe Àax is exponential. Equivalently, one can express ex ante utility as
In our dynamic setting, we generalize this specification as follows. 
required to deliver a given lifetime utility level in an incentive compatible way. Then any efficient allocation cannot be improved by the variations above. That is, these variations cannot reduce the net present value of consumption. Indexing the variation at any node by D 0 and solving for D that keeps utility constant we can write the minimization subproblem as in (24). In this case, the first-order necessary and sufficient condition coincides with the condition obtained if the worker could save and borrow freely at a market interest rate q À1 .
Proposition 6. The optimum in (24) corresponds to the economy where agents can borrow and save freely at the interest rate q À1 . The following Euler equation holds:
Hence, for the CARA preferences under consideration, the constrained-optimality condition and the Euler equation coincide. This section focused on a moral hazard setting, but a similar result should hold in a Mirrleesian environment.
Welfare gains: quantitative explorations
In this section, we investigate the welfare gains from the optimal savings distortions derived in Section 3. The analysis proceeds along the lines of Farhi and Werning (2006) . We focus on the case where the baseline allocation features a geometric random walk consumption process while work effort is constant. The analysis in this section covers both to the private-information and moral-hazard settings. Assumption 1. The baseline allocation fc t ; h t g is such that h t ¼h is constant and c t is a geometric random walk c tþ1 ¼ c t tþ1 with tþ1 identically and independently distributed over time.
Partial equilibrium
Let us first assume that there is a linear technology to transfer resources from period to period with a gross rate of return R ¼ q À1 . The following proposition shows that if the baseline allocation is a pure geometric random walk and h t is constant, then the cost minimizing allocation attainable through our variations is also a pure geometric random walk.
Proposition 7. Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Then the cost minimizing allocation fc t g is obtained by multiplying fc t g by a deterministic drift g À1 : Hence the optimal allocationc t attainable from the baseline allocation through our variations is such thatc t also follows a geometric random walk, but with a different drift g À1 E½ instead of E½ for the baseline allocation. This new drift ensures that the constrained-optimality condition-a necessary and sufficient condition for optimality within our class of variations-holds at the optimal allocationc t : Note that b and h 1Àr play exactly similar roles in this formula: when h t ¼h is constant, it acts as a discount factor. This effect is compounded with b to produce an effective discount factorb ¼ bh 1Àr . It is also useful to note that if g41, then a41 and vice versa. Increasing g while maintaining the value of qE½ is exactly equivalent to decreasing the effective discount factorb. In other words, the higher g, the lower the effective discount factorb that makes the constrainedoptimality condition hold.
Note also that given qE½ and g, the intercept a depends only on the intertemporal elasticity of substitution parameter r. The risk aversion parameter g only shifts the effective discount factorb required for the constrained-optimality condition to hold.
Economists are used to thinking of the discount factor as a primitive of the model, and as the equilibrium interest rate as an outcome. However, contrary to interest rates, discount factors are not directly observable. In fact, most of the evidence concerning discount factors comes from equilibrium values of interest rates. Therefore, in the formula for the intercept a, we prefer to think of the equilibrium interest rate q as the primitive and to solve for the effective discount factorb that makes the constrained-optimality condition hold given g and qE½.
Intertemporal wedge: We can compute the optimal wedge in closed form
Note that the wedge is always positive. Its magnitude in this example is independent of r and is entirely determined by g; that is by the agent's attitude toward risk. This highlights that the origin of the wedge is the combination of two factors: the riskiness of tomorrow's consumption from today's perspective and the agent's risk aversion. Absent shocks, there would be no reason to distort savings and the Euler equation would hold. Similarly, if the agent were risk neutral, there would be no reason to distort savings and the wedge would also be zero. We can re-express the wedge using the formalism of cumulants: let m be the moment generating function of log e ð Þ:
The nth cumulant of log e ð Þ is given by k n d n m dy n 0 ð Þ: Cumulants are closely related to moments, as we see from the first four:
The notation is standard, with m 1 denoting the conditional mean of log e ð Þ and m n ; for nX1; denoting the nth central conditional moment. Using this notation, we derive a formula that ties the wedge to the higher order moments or cumulants of log e ð Þ :
In the lognormal case, which we explore below, the higher cumulants k n of log e ð Þ are zero for nX3 and we obtain a closed form for the wedge which depends only on the variance s 2 e of log e ð Þ : log 1 À t ð Þ¼gs 2 e : Outside of the lognormal case, higher cumulants k n of log e ð Þ are non-zero and higher moments of the distribution of consumption growth rates affect the wedge. For example, we can analyze the impact of skewness k 3 : The contribution of this term to the wedge is given by k 3 g 1Àg ð Þ
2 : Hence, negative skewness -k 3 o0 -decreases the wedge if go1 and increases the wedge if g41:
Welfare gains: The costsk and k of the baseline and the optimal allocations are easily computed to bẽ
Combining these two expressions, we can derive the relative reduction in expected discounted cost allowed by our variations.
Proposition 8. Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Then the relative expected discounted cost reduction achieved by going from the baseline allocation to the optimal allocation is
By homogeneity, the ratio of the cost of the optimal allocation to the cost of the baseline does not depend on the current level of consumption c. Given the cost of the baseline allocation, or in other words, given qE½, g is a sufficient statistic for the welfare gains attainable through the variations. It is therefore instructive to perform some comparative statics with respect to g.
Given qE½ and g, the relative expected cost reduction depends only on the intertemporal elasticity of substitution parameter r À1 . This is a direct consequence of the fact noted above that given g and qE½, the intercept a does not depend on the risk aversion parameter.
At g ¼ 1, the reduction in cost is 0: This is because in this case, the constrained-optimality condition holds at the baseline allocation. Moreover, a Taylor expansion around g ¼ 1 reveals that the cost reduction is zero at the first order in g and increasing in g:
When g goes to infinity on the other hand, the cost reduction goes to 1=ð1 À qE½Þ. Taking g to infinity is like taking the effective discount factor to 0: In that case, the optimal allocation for D À1 ¼ 1 is
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In the limit where r goes to 1, we get
which is exactly the expression derived in Farhi and Werning (2006 
The effective discount factorb ¼ bh 1Àr can then be determined:
Knowingb; the sufficient statistic g for the welfare gains in formula (37) can be derived using the formula in Proposition 7.
Proposition 9. If Assumption 1 holds and the Euler equation holds at the baseline allocation, then
When is lognormally distributed log $Nðm; s 2 Þ, then the wedge t, the change in drift from the baseline allocation g and the welfare gains can be computed in terms of the mean m and the variance s 2 of consumption growth: Corollary 1. Suppose that is lognormally distributed log $Nðm; s 2 Þ, then t and g are given by
As we already discussed, the wedge is increasing in the degree of risk aversion g and in the magnitude of the shocks s 2 : Moreover, g and s 2 affect the wedge in a complementary way. When shocks are lognormal, the formula takes the remarkably simple form t ¼ 1 À exp½Àgs 2 . The crucial parameter g is associated with ðg=rÞs 2 . The higher the variance of the shocks, and the higher risk aversion, the higher the required change in drift g between the baseline and the optimum. Similarly, the higher the intertemporal elasticity of substitution r À1 , the higher g. Intuitively, this can be seen by taking the limit as r goes to 0, so that consumption at different dates become perfect substitutes. The Euler equation and the optimality condition are incompatible in the limit where r goes to 0, since the required change in drift g goes to infinity. Note, however, that in this case, the intercept a converges to 1 À qðE½ Àg Þ À1 E½ 1Àg . Intuitively, when r goes to 0, it is optimal to front-load consumption more and more. In the limit, it is best to deliver all consumption in the first period so that agents are entirely shielded from consumption risk. The cost reduction is nontrivial. Indeed, we have
The gains are increasing in the intertemporal elasticity of substitution r À1 : intuitively, as consumption at different dates become more substitutable, it becomes easier to compensate the agent for a decrease in the drift in consumption in order to lower his exposure to risk. In fact, we can derive a simple formula for small s : From this formula it is apparent that at the first relevant order, risk aversion and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution enter the formula for the gains only through g 2 =r. Quantitative exploration: Figs. 1 and 2 plot the reciprocal of the relative cost reduction using Eq. (37) as a measure of the relative welfare gains as a function of s 2 . The figures use an empirically relevant range for s 2 which is taken to vary between 0 and 0:007. The value of qE½ is set to 0:97.
In Fig. 1 , the intertemporal elasticity of substitution r À1 is set to 1 and the different curves correspond to different values of the relative risk aversion coefficient g ranging from 1 to 3 in increments of 0:5: The gains are increasing in g: Increasing g by 10% is exactly equivalent to increasing s 2 by 10%. In Fig. 2 , the relative risk aversion coefficient g is set to 1, and the different curves correspond to different values of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution r À1 ranging from 0:5 to 1 in increments of 0:1. The gains are increasing in r À1 . Increasing r À1 by 10% is roughly equivalent to increasing s 2 by 5%. Two lessons emerge from our simple exercise. First, welfare gains range from small to potentially large. Second, they depend a lot on three parameters of the model: g, r and s 2 : The coefficient of relative risk aversion g and the variance of consumption growth s 2 play an especially important role over the range consistent with the available empirical evidence concerning these two parameters. The intertemporal elasticity of substitution r À1 is important, but its influence over the empirically relevant range is somewhat less dramatic. This is both because the range for this parameter is smaller and because r À1 enters with a smaller power than g and s 2 as can be seen from (39).
General equilibrium
Up to now we have restricted the analysis to partial equilibrium. Alternatively, one can think of the results we have derived so far as applying to an economy facing some given constant rate of return to capital. In Farhi and Werning (2006) , we argue that neglecting general equilibrium effects magnifies the welfare gains from reforming the consumption allocation. Here we explore the joint influence of risk aversion and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution on general equilibrium welfare gains.
Planning problem: Consider a baseline allocation fc t ; h t g. In order to set-up the planning problem, it is useful to introduce the following notation: let Uðfc t ; h t g; D À1 Þ be the set of allocationsc t attainable through our variations from the baseline allocation fD À1 c t ; h t g. Note that the shifted allocation fD À1 c t ; h t g is incentive compatible and delivers a value lifetime utility increased by a multiplicative factor D À1 to the agent. In general equilibrium, the planning problem can be set-up as
Necessary and sufficient conditions for this problem arẽ 
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The analysis of this planning problem is tackled in full generality in Farhi and Werning (2006) , where we also explore nongeometric random walk baseline allocations: we provide cases where (40) can be separated into two different planning problems, one involving only the idiosyncratic part of the allocationc i t and the other only the aggregate partC t : Here instead, we focus on the special case where the baseline allocation features geometric random walk consumption with constant h t .
Geometric random walk with constant h t : Suppose that the baseline allocation features geometric random walk consumption with constant h t and constant aggregate consumption: 
The property that the idiosyncratic component of the baseline allocation is already optimal relies crucially on the assumption of geometric random walk with constant h t . Intuitively, as we saw above, the planner only wants to affect the drift of fc i t g; which is impossible in the case of an endowment economy where
In the case where the baseline allocation is a geometric random walk with constant h t , we can therefore restrict our attention to the aggregate part of the allocation: all the potential welfare gains come from modifying the aggregate component of the allocation.
Euler equation at the baseline: Suppose that in addition, the baseline allocation represents a steady state where the Euler equation holds (Table 1) .
Let
be the inverse of the steady state interest rate. In that case, we can derive as above an expression forb :
E½E½ Àg . That the baseline allocation is a steady state implies in particular that E½ ¼ 1. We can therefore simplify the formula forb :
The optimal allocation will eventually reach a steady state where the inverse of the interest rateq SS is given byq SS ¼b .
When is lognormally distributed log $Nðm; s 2 Þ, then we can computeb andq SS in terms of m and s
2
. We get the remarkably simple formula:
Eq. (42) shows that the new interest rate is higher than the initial interest rate (that is,K SS oK SS ) by a factor given by expðgs 2 Þ. The higher risk aversion and the variance of consumption growth, the higher the increase in steady state interest rates, and the higher the reduction in steady state capital stock. Because the baseline allocation has no trend, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution does not affect the level of the new interest rateq À1 SS . The only thing our variations allow in this case is to correct the externality created by the precautionary savings motive, the intensity of which is controlled only by the relative risk aversion g and the variance of consumption growth s 2 .
As we just discussed, the coefficient of relative risk aversion g and the variance of consumption growth s 2 control the decrease in capital between the baseline steady state and the optimal steady state. The intertemporal elasticity of substitution, on the other hand, controls the speed of the transition: the higher r À1 , the faster the transition, and the higher the welfare gains.
We now compute the welfare gains in general equilibrium for the neoclassical production function F ðK; NÞ ¼ K a N 1Àa þ ð1 À dÞK. We set a ¼ 0:36, d ¼ 0:09. We set the variance of consumption growth at the highest end of the values we used in our partial equilibrium computations: s 2 ¼ 0:007. We take the initial interest rate at the baseline allocation to be r SS ¼ q À1 SS À 1 ¼ 3:07%. We perform the computations of welfare gains for three different values of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution r À1 -0:5, 0:75 and 1-and three different values for the relative risk aversion coefficient g-1; 2 and 3. For each configuration of these parameters, we report the welfare gains in partial equilibrium dW PE if the interest rate were fixed at r SS , the welfare gains in general equilibrium dW GE and the interest rater SS at the new steady state for the optimal allocation.
An important general lesson from this exercise, as pointed out in Farhi and Werning (2006) , is that taking into account the concavity of the production function-that is, taking into account general equilibrium effects-greatly mitigates the welfare gains. This is because in general equilibrium, reducing the drift of the consumption process-the optimal policy under partial equilibrium-yields lower and lower gains as consumption and capital go down over time and the equilibrium interest rate increases. As a consequence, it is optimal to reduce the drift differential. Eventually, under the optimal allocation, the drift differential goes to 0 and the economy reaches the new steady state with a higher interest rate and a lower capital stock.
Even though the partial equilibrium welfare gains can be as high as 12.33%, the general equilibrium welfare gains never go above 0:79%. The highest gains are reached for the highest value of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution r À1 ¼ 1 and the highest value of the relative risk aversion coefficient g ¼ 3: For those parameter values, the new interest rate is substantially higher than the initial interest rate:r SS ¼ 5:28%, whereas r SS ¼ 3:07%. Despite this large difference in interest rates and therefore in steady state capital stocks, the general equilibrium welfare gains are moderate at 0:79%.
Conclusion
This paper studied constrained efficient allocations in private information economies. We focused on how the optimal savings distortions featured in those allocations depend on individuals' preferences. We introduced a recursive class of preferences that allowed a separation of risk aversion from intertemporal substitution, and derived general results on the nature of optimal distortions.
We then performed a quantitative investigation for a class of geometric random walk consumption allocations. We showed that savings distortions depend only on risk aversion and the variance of the shocks to consumption. However, the welfare gains from these distortions depend on both parameters, although we found greater sensitivity to risk aversion.
The purpose of the quantitative exercise was to illustrate the role preferences, but it was limited in terms of the consumption allocations it considered. In Farhi and Werning (2006) we undertake a comprehensive exploration of savings distortions and welfare gains for general consumption processes.
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